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	<title>Punchscan</title>
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	<link>http://punchscan.org/blog</link>
	<description>The Blog</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 19:54:17 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Scantegrity II Profiled in Discover Magazine</title>
		<link>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/09/04/scantegrity-ii-profiled-in-discover-magazine/</link>
		<comments>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/09/04/scantegrity-ii-profiled-in-discover-magazine/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 19:50:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Aleks Essex</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Press]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://punchscan.org/blog/?p=109</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Discover magazine features Scantegrity II in their current issue. The article is titled Protecting Your Vote With Invisible Ink by Melissa Lafsky:
&#8220;Unfortunately, our current digital democracy leaves massive fraud and massive error imperceptible and untrackable. And transparency—not just of the software code, but of the whole voting system—has never been more important. Each voter should be [...]]]></description>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>It ain&#8217;t easy being green</title>
		<link>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/08/22/it-aint-easy-being-green/</link>
		<comments>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/08/22/it-aint-easy-being-green/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 17:49:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Aleks Essex</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Press]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://punchscan.org/blog/?p=101</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The original Scantegrity I article appeared in the May/June edition of IEEE Security and Privacy magazine.
We noticed at the time that Scantegrity II co-author Ron Rivest is referenced in the cover art as a candidate on the DRE touch-screen menu.
More recently we also noticed that co-author Jeremy Clark was depicted as the voter  

]]></description>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Scantegrity on MSN</title>
		<link>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/08/21/scantegrity-on-msn/</link>
		<comments>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/08/21/scantegrity-on-msn/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Aug 2008 20:31:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Richard Carback</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Press]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://punchscan.org/blog/?p=96</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[MSN Tech &#38; Gadgets mentions Scantegrity in an article titled &#8220;Click Here For President: The Future of Voting in America&#8221;:
Voters make their mark alongside their choice for president with a special pen — and the pen reveals a randomized code. When voters look up the serial number of their ballot online, they can make sure [...]]]></description>
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		<item>
		<title>Scantegrity in MIT Technology Review</title>
		<link>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/08/19/scantegrity-in-mit-technology-review/</link>
		<comments>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/08/19/scantegrity-in-mit-technology-review/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2008 12:50:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Richard Carback</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Press]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://punchscan.org/blog/?p=92</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The MIT Technology Review has a short article about Scantegrity II:
Even optical scanners can misread stray marks, however, and any voting machine can be tampered with after the fact. But a cryptographic system developed under the leadership of electronic-cash pioneer David Chaum can guarantee that every vote cast using an optical scanner is correctly recorded.
Additionally [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/08/19/scantegrity-in-mit-technology-review/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Scantegrity II at EVT08</title>
		<link>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/31/scantegrity-ii-at-evt08/</link>
		<comments>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/31/scantegrity-ii-at-evt08/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Jul 2008 23:06:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Aleks Essex</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://punchscan.org/blog/?p=89</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[We presented Scantegrity II at this year&#8217;s 2008 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (EVT &#8216;08).

The paper can be read here [PDF].



Event Photos



Photo: Me giving the talk at EVT08



Photo: Taking questions



Photo: David and Jeremy going over the slides beforehand




]]></description>
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		<item>
		<title>OVC: Use chain of custody to fix chain of custody!?</title>
		<link>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/31/ovc-use-chain-of-custody-to-fix-chain-of-custody/</link>
		<comments>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/31/ovc-use-chain-of-custody-to-fix-chain-of-custody/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Jul 2008 16:29:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Aleks Essex</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Concepts in E2E]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Voting Goals]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://punchscan.org/blog/?p=84</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Open Voting Consortium and Okori Group offered a new open source voting system solution at LinuxWorld 08. According to the CNET interview:
Dechert says his system is better because it doesn&#8217;t use fancy cryptography, it uses a simple chain of custody.
This statement right here is the deal breaker. Why? I would hope it&#8217;s obvious:

A solution requiring [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/31/ovc-use-chain-of-custody-to-fix-chain-of-custody/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Careful where you vote</title>
		<link>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/20/careful-where-you-vote/</link>
		<comments>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/20/careful-where-you-vote/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 00:41:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jeremy Clark</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Economics of Voting]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Psychology of Voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/20/careful-where-you-vote/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I&#8217;ve written before about the social effects likely to be felt by the introduction of online voting. Here is a new one:
A recently published study by Johan Berger (Wharton), Marc Meredith (MIT), and S. Christian Wheeler (Stanford), whose title says it all &#8220;Contextual priming: Where people vote affects how they vote.&#8221; (Paper). (Hat Tip).
The study [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/20/careful-where-you-vote/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The &#8216;Lawonomics&#8217; of the Secret Ballot</title>
		<link>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/11/the-lawonomics-of-the-secret-ballot/</link>
		<comments>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/11/the-lawonomics-of-the-secret-ballot/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 18:11:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Aleks Essex</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Legislation]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Add new tag]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://punchscan.org/blog/?p=80</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The great Freakonom, Steven Levitt, argues that the market price of vote selling is effectively zero because of its essentially insignificant weighting in the outcome.
Of course I agree entirely with Ben Adida&#8217;s take: the price is effectively zero because the transaction cannot be verified as having been fulfilled.
The design of E2E receipts completely revolves around [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/11/the-lawonomics-of-the-secret-ballot/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Scantegrity II in EVT 2008</title>
		<link>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/11/scantegrity-ii-in-evt-2008/</link>
		<comments>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/11/scantegrity-ii-in-evt-2008/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 17:41:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Richard Carback</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Concepts in E2E]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Voting Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://punchscan.org/blog/?p=79</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[We will be presenting Scantegrity II at the 2008 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop. Here&#8217;s the abstract of our paper:
Scantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability for Optical Scan Election Systems using Invisible Ink Confirmation Codes
by David Chaum, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, Aleksander Essex, Stefan Popoveniuc, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Emily Shen, and Alan T. [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/11/scantegrity-ii-in-evt-2008/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>How secret is your secret ballot? Part 3 of 3: Surveillance</title>
		<link>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/10/how-secret-is-your-secret-ballot-part-3-of-3-surveillance/</link>
		<comments>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/10/how-secret-is-your-secret-ballot-part-3-of-3-surveillance/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 12:00:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Richard Carback</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://punchscan.org/blog/?p=78</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Both part 1 and 2 dealt with interface problems between the voter and a paper ballot, machine, or computer that records her vote. For this last segment, Surveillance, we discuss the ways the voter can be watched to determine her choices. Because the attacker or a device must be present to carry out these attacks, [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://punchscan.org/blog/2008/07/10/how-secret-is-your-secret-ballot-part-3-of-3-surveillance/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
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